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HARMONY OR CACOPHONY?
A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THE RESPONSES TO THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS AT HOME AND IN THE EU
J. Scott Colesanti*

To be sure, the recent reforms to the U.S. regulatory system are far from
final. Even if House Republicans do not succeed in turning back the clock, the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (‘‘Dodd-Frank’’)1
require so many studies, interpretations, and effectuating regulations that it will
evade meaningful analysis for years. And while the nominally bipartisan
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission recently issued its report on causes for the
financial crisis, that spirited document both spread the blame and disclosed
infighting so as to cloud sufficiently any lasting impressions.
Separately, the European Union-----tasked with confronting the same economic
foes while facing its own legislative obstacle of supranationalism-----has issued
robust rounds of Directives, Regulations, and Recommendations. 2 Similar to
efforts in the United States, the culmination of these reforms will trigger debate
about business regulation on that continent for years to come.
So where do the two regulatory mosaics agree on primary culprits? And how
strongly do they endorse targeted reform? An initial analysis might support the
conclusion that the EU feels stronger about the culpability of certain practices
*
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and institutions than its American counterparts.
Take short selling, for example. While the SEC’s response in recent years
has crystallized into gradually squeezing the most offensive forms of the
questionable trading into a non-controversial category termed ‘‘abusive short
selling,’’ this remedy has done little to quell the fires among aggrieved investors
who feel that Dodd-Frank ultimately took aim at that pernicious practice only in
the most oblique of fashions. 3 Meanwhile, the EU, although similarly concluding
that ‘‘short selling is often not abusive,’’4 felt threatened enough by the practice
to move to (i) enable the new EU regulatory body to suspend trading in a
particular issue within a Member State for three months, 5 and (ii) require that,
for certain issues, the seller evidence his borrowing of the subject shares or
entering into an agreement for the same. 6 By contrast, requirements in the U.S.
are less stringent, as the effectuating broker-dealer merely must possess
‘‘[r]easonable grounds to believe that the security can be borrowed so that it can
be delivered on the date delivery is due’’ before accepting a short sale order in
an equity security from another person. 7
Separately, hedge funds, while coming involuntarily on the regulatory radar
screen on both continents, in the EU are restricted from marketing to entities
outside of the EU unless the counterparty is subject to an ‘‘equivalent
[regulatory] regime.’’8
Concerning the regulation of OTC derivatives, while both the U.S. and the
EU have endorsed the notion of transparency, pan-European regulators shall

3

See Letter to Senator Dodd and Representative Frank on Abusive Naked Short Selling, INV. VILL.,
http://www.investorvillage.com/smbd.asp?mb= 3532&mn= 5603&pt= msg&mid= 1683231 (last visited Mar. 27,
2011) (urging ‘‘hearings on abusive naked short selling and its effect on the market and public companies’’).
4
See Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament of the Council on Short Selling and
Certain Aspects of Credit Default Swaps, at 3, COM (2010) 483 final (Sept. 15, 2010), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/short_selling/20100915_proposal_en.pdf.
5
Id. at 9.
6
Id. at 7.
7
17 C.F.R. § 242.203(b) (2008).
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See Council Directive 2010/78, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 133 (EU), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ LexUriServ.do?uri= OJ:L:2010:331:0120:0161:EN:PDF; see also Parliament ushers
in new EU rules for hedge funds and private equity, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT PRESS SERV.,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/en/pressroom/ content/20101110IPR93908/html/Parliament-ushers-in-new-EUrules-for-hedge-funds-and-private-equity.
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have the authority to define subject derivatives within the Member State. 9 The
U.S. remains dependent upon the efforts of the SEC and the CFTC to identify
the potentially troublesome vehicles (and to play nice in coordinating information
thereon).
Finally, the very notion of fraud prohibitions is under review across the
pond. In June 2010, the EU commenced a consultation period on the 2004
Market Abuse Directive. 10 It is noteworthy that countries like Germany already
outlaw even attempted insider trading. Conversely, Rule 10b-5, 11 America’s
broad, catchall antifraud prohibition, has been left to its cursed fate of continued
ad hoc interpretation by federal courts, which see attempted insider trading cases
only on the rarest of occasions and often via consent agreements. 12
Overall, the two systems share many common responses, with a modicum of
differences. But the significance of these dissimilarities (as inchoate as they may
be) is more than just academic. Somewhere in the SEC it has no doubt been
noted that the Europeans-----at least in name-----scrapped their pan-European
regulator in favor of the new European Securities and Markets Authority
authorized to directly oversee credit rating agencies within EU Member States. 13
And the decades-old EU concept of ‘‘transfrontier insider dealing’’14 may be a
concept worth importing as SEC enforcement efforts go global. Finally,
Europe’s restrictions on hedge fund marketing outside the EU may inspire a
wave of market protectionism viewed by some as pure jingoism.
One interesting side note concerns the role of the investor in this whole mess.
While the SEC appears poised to remain true to its aged crusade to shield the
9

See Commission Proposal for a Regulation on OTC Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade
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17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011).
12
Ann Hadley Vom Eigen, Securities Fraud, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 687, 688 (1987).
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Commission Regulation 1095/2010, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010
establishing a European Supervisory, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 84, available at
http://www.esma.europa.eu/popup2.php?id = 7331.
14
Council Directive 89/592, of 13 November 1989 on Coordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing, 1989
O.J. (L 334) 30 (EC), available at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= CELEX:31989L0592:EN: HTML.
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sheep investor from slaughter, the EU perhaps invites more useful debate on the
role of the purchaser in the ever-complicating bazaar. For example, Britain’s
proposed Consumer Protection and Markets Authority 15 from last year was
drawn to serve the twin goals of investor protection and market integrity while
balancing such protections with ‘‘consumer responsibility.’’ As products grow
more complicated and national interests in protecting home markets grow
stronger, perhaps individual investor accountability will similarly grow from
option to necessity.
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